B. Proofs of Others

248. A certain doctorText cancelled by Scotus: “The reason [n.240] is also confirmed because all relative opposites equally involve contradiction; therefore if some of the second mode do not involve it then neither do others.” ¹⁵⁹ argues otherwise in this way: the first person is constituted by relation to the second, and only by relation of origin;     therefore one should posit in divine reality diverse supposits of which one is from another, etc     . Proof of the first proposition: for the first person is relative to the second; and if it were not constituted by that relation then that relation would either be accidental to it or would be adventitious to the personWhich these articles are is obscure. The articles must at any rate have said that the Trinity is not a matter of demonstration but of faith. ¹⁶⁰ constituted, which is discordant.

249. Secondly he argues thus: a virtue supremely active diffuses itself supremely; but it would not diffuse itself supremely if it did not produce something supreme,A reference to Henry of Ghent. ¹⁶¹ or unless it communicated a supreme nature to something;     therefore etc     .

250. OthersInterpolation: “and it would be as it were adventitious to the person already [constituted].” ¹⁶² argue through the idea of good, that the good is of itself communicative;     therefore the supremely good is supremely communicative; only internally because nothing ‘other’ can be supreme.

251. There is a similar argument about the idea of the perfect, that the perfect is what can produce something like itself, from Metaphysics 1.1.981b7 and Meteorology 4.3.380a12-15; therefore the first agent, which is most perfect, can produce something like itself. But the more perfect is what can produce something univocally like itself than equivocally so, because an equivocal production is imperfect; therefore etc     .

252. These reasons do not make the intended proposition [n.220] clear through what is more manifest, whether to the faithful or to the infidel.

The first [n.248], when it accepts that the first person is constituted by relation, is, if it intends to persuade the infidel, accepting something less known than the principal proposition; for it is less known to such a person that a per se subsistent thing is constituted by relation than that there is production in divine reality.Interpolation: “and this thing a second person.” ¹⁶³ If the reason intends to persuade the faithful it still proceeds from that is less known, because that there is production in divine reality is an evident article of faith; but it is not so primarily evident that it is an article of faith that the first person is constituted by relation.A reference to Bonaventure and Richard of Middleton. ¹⁶⁴

253. And when it is argued further that the distinction there is only by relations of origin [n.248], this not as immediately manifest from faith as is the conclusion which it is intending to show.Interpolation: “because if some per se subsistent person is known to have been produced, yet he would not seem to himself to be so through a relation but through an absolute.” ¹⁶⁵,Interpolation: “Nor is the consequence valid, because common inspiriting is a relation and not constitutive.” ¹⁶⁶

254. When he proves that otherwise the relation would be adventitious to the constituted person and so would be an accident [n.248], this proof does not seem to be valid, because it could be argued in a similar way about active inspiriting, about which all hold that it does not constitute a person, nor yet is it an accident, because it is perfectly the same as the foundation that is the essence in the person.

255. And when it is argued secondly that something supremely active is supremely diffusive of itself, the response would be that this is true to the extent that it is possible for something to be diffused, but it would be necessary to prove that it would be possible for something to be diffused or communicated in unity of nature.

256. The same to the third about the idea of good [n.250], because it would be necessary to prove that the communication of the same thing or nature would be possible, because there is no power or communication of goodnessText cancelled by Scotus: “Also it is not necessary for the intended proposition, because even if the distinction there were in another way, origin could still be preserved.” ¹⁶⁷ for an impossible that involves a contradiction.

257. Likewise to the fourth ‘the perfect is of a nature to produce something supreme like itself’ [n.251], this is true as to something that is a supreme as similar to itself as can be produced;Interpolation: ‘nor is this consequence valid that ‘the distinction is through relation, therefore through a relation of origin’ because not all relations are relations of origin.” ¹⁶⁸ therefore one ought to prove that a like univocal supreme would be producible.Interpolation: “and consequently neither is the communication of goodness supreme.” ¹⁶⁹